MONTREAL -- For Judge Marc-Andre Blanchard who has just rendered his judgment on the Act respecting the laicity of the State, requiring teachers not to display religious symbols during their working hours would be a violation of "the very soul and essence of their person" and would amount to denying the "very foundation of their being" (paragraph [1098]).

Have we deconfessionalized school boards to get to this point?

According to the judgment, not only should religious displays by government employees not be prohibited, but on the contrary, they should be promoted.

Thus, the judge agrees with the English school boards who "wish to hire and promote persons wearing religious symbols" [993].

He describes this practice as common sense.

To support his view, the judge quotes extensively from the report of expert witness Thomas Dee, a professor at Stanford University, whose research examines the benefits of racially diverse teachers on academic achievement in Tennessee public schools. His research is presented as providing evidence that students of colour would benefit from being paired with a teacher of their same "race " or ethnicity.

There is no mention of religious symbols or religion in this study, and the Quebec Attorney General asked that the report be rejected on the grounds that the research is not relevant to secularism. Yet, the report's conclusions are extrapolated to religious symbols, inferring that there is an educational benefit to assigning, for example, a veiled teacher to Muslim students.

Do we really want to promote the veiling of Muslim girls in Quebec?

We hardly know where to begin in expressing our dismay and astonishment at such a recommendation.

First of all, a religious symbol can in fact be removed, as it is not an intrinsic characteristic of the person like the colour of their skin. A religious symbol represents an obedience to a particular religious dogma. It transmits a religious message.

Why would we want to promote such a religious message?

In no case can it be conflated with a racial or ethnic identity, nor used in the definition of a "visible minority." This is, however, precisely what the judge does when he speaks of "minority pupils wearing religious symbols" [1102].

This assignment of each child's identity to a religious community, defined, moreover, by religious symbols, is contrary to any universalist vision of rights. It is antagonistic to the very principle of freedom. If a child is associated a priori, at birth, with a religion and even with religious symbols, then how can we speak of religious freedom?

Moreover, how can we not be startled by such a "pedagogical" suggestion to assign to a student a teacher wearing the religious symbols "of his or her community", such as for example assigning a veiled teacher to a student who is considered Muslim?

How can we not see the undue pressure that is thus put on young girls from Muslim countries and on their parents, to whom we send the message that a "good Muslim" is a veiled Muslim? How can the judge not recognize that this is a flagrant attack on their freedom of conscience and religion?

Obviously, he does not see it, because he affirms that "the parents of students cannot legally maintain that the exposure of their children to religious symbols worn by a teacher in school infringes their freedom of conscience or religion or that of their children" [1057].

In so doing, he dismisses out of hand the affidavits of parents in favour of the law, including ourselves. Our sworn testimonies, including those of four parents of Muslim origin, were completely ignored and are not mentioned in any line of the judgment.

Moreover, the judge refuses to recognize the sexism of religions. Neither does he recognize how the Islamic veil transmits a message of the subjugation of women [1042]. Thus, he gives no credibility to the testimony of Yolande Geadah, an expert for the group Pour les droits des femmes du Québec, who eloquently exposed, during the trial, the eminently sexist religious discourse behind the Islamic veil.

TWO IRRECONCILABLE VISIONS OF LIVING TOGETHER

Of course, it is no surprise to anyone that Judge Blanchard is against the secularism law. He made this abundantly clear during the trial, not to mention that it was this same judge who, in 2018, suspended the provision, in the law on religious neutrality (section 10, PL-62), which required that the provision and reception of public services be made with the face uncovered.

Nevertheless, we would have expected more attentiveness and objectivity from the judge. This was not the case.

Whether in court or in public debate, we are faced with two irreconcilable visions of society.

As we know, the duty of neutrality of the State and of certain of its representatives while on the job is supported by a large majority of Quebecers of all origins, believers as well as non-believers or agnostics.

As the third and eighth paragraphs of the preamble of the Act respecting the laicity of the State make clear, it is precisely “in accordance with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty” that “it is incumbent on the Parliament of Québec to determine the principles according to which and manner in which relations between the State and religions are to be governed in QuEbec” and that “State laicity should be affirmed in a manner that ensures a balance between the collective rights of the Québec nation and human rights and freedoms.”

The government has every legitimacy to enforce it.

Nadia El-Mabrouk and François Dugré, Parents who testified at the Bill 21 trial in Superior Court